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Standoff Situations and the Fifth
Amendment
In Miranda v. Arizona,' the Supreme Court attempted to neutralize the
atmosphere of compulsion that it detected in custodial police interrogation'
by ordering that the police inform suspects of their constitutional rights
before interrogation.3 Since that decision, courts have considered whether
"Miranda warnings"4 should be given in a variety of other factual settings
involving police-suspect encounters.' In deciding whether an individual is
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The Court described this compulsion in the following terms: "[T]he very fact of custodial inter-
rogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. . .. It is
obvious that . . . an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the
individual to the will of his examiner." Id. at 455, 457 (footnote omitted). For descriptions of the
coercive aspects of custodial interrogation, see Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
Amicus Curiae, at 13-20, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (finding custodial interrogation
"inherently compelling"); Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American
Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 31-32 (A. Howard ed. 1965). But see 8
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2252, at 329 n.27 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
(because police lack legal authority to compel confessions, right against self-incrimination does not
apply at police station).
3. "[The suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at 479. Cf. Brief of the ACLU, Amicus Curiae, at 3 (advocat-
ing that presence of counsel be required to protect privilege against self-incrimination).
4. In order to comply with Miranda, police officers typically carry cards with some version of the
following set of warnings printed on them:
(1) You have the right to remain silent.
(2) Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
(3) You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are
being questioned.
(4) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any
questioning, if you wish one.
P. WESTON & K. WELLS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 179 (1970).
The police obtain waivers of the Miranda rights by asking the following questions immediately
after reading the above warnings:
(1) Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?
(2) Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?
Id.; J. HORGAN, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 61 (1974).
5. The Supreme Court has held that Miranda governs many of these settings. See, e.g., Estelle v.
Smith, 101 S. Ct. 1886 (1981) (interview conducted pursuant to court order by state-employed psychi-
atrist to determine defendant's competency to stand trial); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)
(police interrogation of arrested suspect in his own bedroom); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968) (interrogation by IRS agents of prison inmate regarding matter unrelated to sentence he was
serving at that time). See generally p. 360 infra. The Court has declined to apply Miranda in other
instances, however. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (interrogation of suspect who
came voluntarily to police station at request of police); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564
(1976) (grand jury testimony of subpoenaed witness); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976)
(interrogation of individual suspected of tax fraud conducted in private residence by IRS agents);
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (interrogation at prison disciplinary hearing that was not
part of criminal prosecution); see also Annot., 46 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1977) (collecting post-Miranda
Supreme Court cases bearing on Miranda issues); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970) (collecting federal
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entitled to these warnings, courts have implicitly assumed that a criminal
suspect can be informed of his rights prior to interrogation without ad-
verse effect on collateral police objectives. In practice, however, this as-
sumption is not always well founded. In "standoff" situations,6 where the
police communicate with a suspect in order to obtain his surrender, ad-
ministration of Miranda warnings is likely to frustrate efforts to resolve
the crisis peacefully.7
This Note argues that although standoff situations evoke the same con-
cerns for a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination8 as
those addressed in Miranda, giving the suspect Miranda warnings in such
situations produces undesirable results. As a solution, the Note proposes
the following per se rule: whenever the police have probable cause to ar-
rest a suspect, and engage him in conversation in order to bring about his
surrender, any incriminating statements that the suspect may make during
the conversation may not be used against him at trial.
I. The Problem of a Barricaded Suspect
In the classic police interrogation setting, the interaction between police
officer and suspect involves a single police function-the investigation of
crime." In standoff settings, by contrast, the police perform non-investiga-
tive, "peacekeeping" duties"° in addition to their usual roles as interro-
and state cases on custodial interrogation).
6. This Note will use the term "standoff situation" to mean a confrontation between the police
and a suspect in which the police have probable cause to arrest and are in sufficient proximity to
communicate with the suspect and physically prevent him from escaping, but are temporarily pre-
vented from carrying out the formal arrest because they lack immediate physical control over him. See
pp. 346-47 infra. The term "standoff suspect" will refer to the suspect involved in a standoff situation.
7. This conclusion rests on the assumption that informing such a suspect of his right to remain
silent and warning him that anything he says can be used against him in court will discourage him
from talking to the police and thereby impair successful negotiation. See United States v. Mesa, 638
F.2d 582, 588 n.5 (3d Cir. 1980) (opinion of Seitz, C.J.) (emphasizing antagonistic nature of Mi-
randa warnings).
8. The Fifth Amendment makes no explicit reference to a "right against self-incrimination." U.S.
CONST. amend. V ("No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . .") Indeed, the term "self-incrimination" "seems to be of twentieth-century vintage." L.
LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT viii (1968). The term, however, is familiar and is there-
fore a convenient shorthand device.
9. See A. AUBRY & R. CAPUTO, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 39 (1965) (characterizing interroga-
tion as "germane to the parent field of investigation"); J. HORGAN, supra note 4, at 59 (1974) (defin-
ing interrogation as "a process of probing and gathering available data in crime solving"). The inves-
tigatory nature of police interrogation is also revealed by manuals designed to assist police in
investigating crime. See, e.g., F. INBAU & F. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 11
(2d ed. 1967) (privacy during interrogation essential to prevent distraction of suspect from investiga-
tion); C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 111 (2d ed. 1970) (interrogation
room at police station "should be designed ... to enhanc[e] the concentration of both the interrogator
and the subject on the matter under questioning").
10. For the purposes of this Note, "peacekeeping" duties consist of the quotidian activities that
the police are called upon to perform in furtherance of an ordered society. J. CAMPBELL, J. SAHID, &
D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED 286, 305-06 (1969). See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
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gators. Traditional Miranda doctrine, developed with conventional inter-
rogation in mind, fails to deal adequately with these more complicated
circumstances.
A. A Paradigmatic Case
The recent case of United States v. Mesa11 graphically illustrates the
complexity of situations in which police perform more than a purely in-
vestigative function. The case involved the arrest of Rigoberto Mesa,
whom the FBI believed was responsible for two shootings.12 FBI agents
went to a motel where Mesa was staying in order to arrest him. Mesa had
barricaded himself in his room and was apparently armed, however, and
before the agents could carry out the arrest they had to engage in an
extended conversation with him.13 The focal point of this conversation was
a three and one-half hour telephone discussion14 between Mesa and Theo-
dore Viater, an FBI agent with special training in hostage negotiations.
Pursuing the objective of calming Mesa down and defusing the situation,
Viater portrayed himself as Mesa's friend, and thereby gained the sus-
pect's confidence. 5 Consequently, Mesa spoke candidly and openly with
THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 37 (Tent. Draft 1972) (emphasizing complexity of police role). The
police peacekeeping function consumes the overwhelming bulk of police time. See, e.g., H. GOLD.
STEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 32-33 (1977); J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 4
(1968); Bard, Family Crisis Intervention: From Concept to Implementation, in THE CHANGING PO-
LICE ROLE 239, 243 (R. Roberg ed. 1976); Goldstein, Introduction, in POLICE CRISIS INTERVENTION
3 (1977); Saunders, The Role of the Police in THE CHANGING POLICE ROLE 74, 83 (R. Roberg ed.
1976).
The peacekeeping and law enforcement responsibilities of police officers frequently overlap. See
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra, at 41 (describing relationship between police role as "helper"
and as law enforcer); Himmelsbach, Suicide, in POLICE CRISIS INTERVENTION, supra, at 109 (police
may encounter suicidal individuals during course of criminal investigation).
11. 487 F. Supp. 562 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980). See generally 26 VILL. L.
REV. 682 (1981) (discussion of Mesa case).
12. The shootings were not fatal and had taken place the previous day. The victims, Mesa's
daughter and his common-law wife, told FBI agents that Mesa had shot them. Federal law enforce-
ment officials were involved because the shootings had occurred on the Fort Dix Military Reservation
in New Jersey.
13. After evacuating the area around Mesa's room, the agents called to him through a bullhorn,
announcing their possession of an arrest warrant and ordering him to surrender. Although the agents
repeated this command approximately ten times, Mesa did not respond immediately. Uncertain as to
whether Mesa had any hostages and whether he was armed, the agents decided not to attempt an
arrest by force. Mesa, in fact, had no hostages but was armed with a pistol. He eventually responded
to the agents by passing three handwritten notes out to the agents. In these notes, he stated that he
would surrender but that he needed more time to compose himself. He also stated that he did not
want to hurt anyone, and that he wanted to see a psychiatrist. Mesa eventually agreed to accept a
portable closed-circuit telephone so that the FBI agents could converse with him. By this time, some
thirty law enforcement officers had arrived at the motel. 487 F. Supp. at 563-65.
14. See Transcript of Mesa-Viater conversation, reprinted in Appendix to Brief for Appellant 12-
76, United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Mesa transcript].
15. The following speeches by Viater are typical of his attitude throughout the conversation: "Yes
Rigoberto, I am listening to you very intently, ah, I can, I have empathy for what you're saying, I
understand exactly the things that ah, you are expressing to me . . . . And I want you to know that I
Standoff Situations
Viater about many personal matters, including the circumstances sur-
rounding the shootings. 16 After his surrender and formal arrest, Mesa was
given Miranda warnings for the first time. Because the telephone conver-
sation with Viater contained incriminatory statements, 7 Mesa sought to
have the court suppress it at his subsequent trial.
The district court hearing the case found that Mesa's conversation with
Viater was subject to the Miranda rule, and therefore did not admit the
telephone conversation into evidence."8 On appeal, the Third Circuit re-
versed, applying the traditional dual Miranda criteria of "custody" and
"interrogation" to the case.' 9 Mesa had not been subjected to custodial
interrogation; the statements he made thus did not warrant Fifth Amend-
ment protection.2 1 Chief Judge Seitz held that Mesa had not been "in
custody" when the incriminatory statements were made; because of this
conclusion, he found it unnecessary to "address the difficult issue"
whether interrogation had occurred. 21 Judge Adams concurred in the re-
sult 2 but inverted the Chief Judge's reasoning: because Adams decided
that no "interrogation" had occurred, 23 he did not have to "address the
difficult issue" whether custody existed.24 The inconsistency of the Mesa
opinions2' illustrates the failure of conventional Miranda analysis to ac-
commodate the peculiarities of the standoff situation.
understand them and I also want you to know and be aware of the fact that I am here to help you
.... [A]re you aware of that?" Mesa transcript at 14; "I'm concerned about you Rigoberto, I'm
concerned about your welfare, and I'm concerned about your health and I ah want to make absolutely
certain that you and I trust each other and we can bring this whole problem . . . to a successful
resolution. Okay?" id. at 25; "No one will harm you. I make that promise to you and I ah, I make it
with the understanding that I can enforce that. No one is going to harm you. I'm controlling this
whole situation out here. Do you believe that?" id. at 63.
16. The following exchange preceded Mesa's description of the shootings:
MESA: What happened yesterday was a provocation. It was a provocation because I am not a
criminal. I am not a criminal. Because I didn't hurt anybody until I went to Viet Nam.
VIATER: Tell me what happened Rigoberto.
MESA: What happened what?
VIATER: Tell me what happened yesterday. What was the provocation?"
Id. at 17.
17. See note 16 supra. In fact, much of the conversation consists of statements that could have
been used against Mesa at trial. During the course of the conversation, Mesa admitted to shooting two
people, Mesa transcript at 14, 25, and referred many times to the events of the previous day, see, e.g.,
Mesa transcript at 14, 26, 56.
18. 487 F. Supp. at 568.
19. 638 F.2d 582. After the denial of the rehearing, 638 F.2d at 597, Mesa entered a plea of
guilty to the charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, 18 U.S.C. § 113(0.
20. See p. 348 infra.
21. 638 F.2d at 589 (opinion of Seitz, C.J.).
22. Id. at 589.
23. Judge Adams found that the Mesa-Viater conversation did not constitute "interrogation"
under Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), discussed in note 30 infra, principally because
Viater had a non-investigative goal. 638 F.2d at 590 (Adams, J., concurring).
24. 638 F.2d at 590-91 (Adams, J., concurring).
25. The third judge on the Third Circuit panel dissented because he agreed with the District
Court's findings that both custody and interrogation had occurred. Id. at 591 (Weiner, J., dissenting).
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B. The Inadequacy of the Traditional Approach
The test generally used to determine whether the Miranda require-
ments apply in a given instance26 hinges on whether "custodial interroga-
tion," as loosely defined in Miranda,27 has occurred. In making this deter-
mination, courts typically treat the existence of custody and interrogation
as discrete phenomena. 21 Without both components, custodial interroga-
tion does not exist, and the dictates of Miranda accordingly do not apply.
Implementation of this test proves exceedingly problematic in standoff sit-
uations, however. Moreover, important policy concerns make the tradi-
tional doctrine inappropriate for such settings.
1. Problems in Applying the Custodial Interrogation Test
Courts have attempted to isolate inquiries concerning "custody ' 29 from
inquiries concerning "interrogation'"" when applying the Miranda doc-
26. See note 5 supra (citing cases involving application of Miranda to various factual settings); see
generally Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in INSTITUTE OF
CONTINUING LEGAL EDCATION, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 335 (1968) (discussing de-
velopment of Miranda test); Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L.
REV. 859, 926 (1979) (same); Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Consti-
tutes Custodial Interrogation? 25 S.C.L. REV. 699 (1974) (same).
27. The Miranda Court supplied the following definition: "By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 U.S. 436, 444. See also id. at 445,
477, 478 (reiterating this definition).
28. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152 (2d ed. 1972) (describing
dual nature of typical inquiry in determining applicability of Miranda to given situation). In most
custodial interrogation cases, the presence of one of these elements is clear and the inquiry focuses on
whether the other is also present. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (only issue whether
suspect who was arrested, handcuffed, and riding in police car with several officers was interrogated);
United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969) (only issue whether suspect was in custody during
interview at his home); cf Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (issue whether remarks made by
officer riding with arraigned defendant while conversing in police car violated defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel).
29. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (suspect who voluntarily came to sta-
tionhouse for questioning at request of police not in custody); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976) (individual suspected of tax fraud not in custody when questioned by IRS agents at private
residence where he sometimes stayed); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (suspect arrested in own
bedroom, held in custody for Miranda purposes); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (prison
inmate interrogated by IRS agents regarding matters unrelated to sentence he was serving, held in
custody for Miranda purposes).
30. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis, police officers riding in a car with
an arrested defendant made remarks-ostensibly among themselves-that prompted the defendant to
reveal the location of incriminating evidence. The Court held that Innis was not subjected to interro-
gation because the police officers did not have reason to believe that their remarks would induce him
to make a statement. Id. at 302. Compare Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) with Common-
wealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 227, 252 A.2d 575, 579 (1969) ("[A]ny question likely to or expected
to elicit a confession constitutes 'interrogation.' ") (emphasis supplied). See also Commonwealth v.
Brant, 406 N.E.2d 1021, 1026 (Mass.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980) (applying Innis test and
finding statement by police officer to defendant that accomplice had confessed to be interrogation); 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 708 (1981) (discussing Innis test and criticizing it as unworkable); 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 466, 473 (1980) (finding Innis test susceptible to wide variety of
applications).
Standoff Situations
trine.3t In the standoff situation, however, these two elements are inextri-
cably intertwined. The conversation occurs solely because the police are
attempting to take the suspect into formal custody. If the standoff suspect's
custody status were not problematic, the police-suspect conversation-or
arguable interrogation-would not take place. The conversation is an in-
tegral part of the process of arrest,3" which it is intended to facilitate. In
standoff situations, the use of "custody" and "interrogation" as general
labels prompting separate all-or-nothing answers obscures the implication
of the rights that the Miranda Court intended to protect. The unique
nature of these situations demands a less ritualistic analysis.
2. Conflicting Policy Concerns
Policy considerations may explain the reluctance of courts to extend
Fifth Amendment protection to standoff settings. Although the panel ma-
jority in Mesa ostensibly based its holding of admissibility on Miranda,
both opinions also emphasized the explosiveness of the situation.33 Eager
to ensure that police would treat future standoff situations in the peaceful
way that the FBI handled the confrontation in Mesa, the panel majority
feared that a suppression holding under Miranda would present the police
with a "delicate and difficult choice" between investigatory and
peacekeeping goals, a choice that would compromise the preeminent pur-
pose of crisis resolution." According to Chief Judge Seitz, such a holding
would force the police to balance the value of information obtained during
the conversation against the probability that the suspect might "react vio-
lently to the antagonistic-sounding Miranda warnings."3
Judge Adams also noted this dilemma, 36 but his opinion indicates that
31. See note 28 supra.
32. Because of the extended confrontational nature of the standoff situation, the conversation
could not be considered to be "normally attendant to arrest and custody," a category that the Innis
Court excluded in dicta from its definition of "interrogation." 446 U.S. at 301. Moreover, unlike the
standoff situation, Innis involved circumstances where custody was utterly unproblematic. See note 28
supra.
33. 638 F.2d at 588 (opinion of Seitz, C.J.); id. at 589 (Adams, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 588 (opinion of Seitz, C.J.) (requiring suppression in this case would place law enforce-
ment officals in extremely difficult position); id. at 590 (Adams, J., concurring) (when attempting to
save lives through surrender negotiations, police should not have to make "pressured judgment"
whether Miranda warnings will deter suspect from talking).
35. Id. at 588 (opinion of Seitz, C.J.). Hostage negotiators are trained to maintain a congenial
attitude toward hostage-takers during negotiations. See G. MAHER, HOSTAGE 14, 36 (1977) (negotia-
tor should sound sincere and sympathize with hostage-taker's problem); M. MIRON & A. GOLDSTEIN,
HOSTAGE 93 (1978) (negotiator should be skilled at conciliation, compromise, and bargaining); David-
son, Anxiety and Authority: Psychological Aspects for Police in Hostage Negotiations, 9 J. POLICE
SC. & AD. 35, 37 (1981) (negotiator should be patient, clear-headed, and have warm personality); cf
Goldstein, Crisis Intervention Manual for Police, in POLICE CRISIS INTERVENTION 16-20 (1977)
(describing conciliatory methods recommended to police for resolving crises).
36. See note 34 supra.
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other policy considerations militate in favor of the suppression of surren-
der-negotiation statements. For example, admitting such statements into
evidence might impair the ability of future hostage negotiators to generate
the atmosphere of trust necessary to resolve the crisis. 7 Thus, if the state-
ments were admissible, prosecutors might be tempted to use them to ob-
tain a conviction at the expense of future standoff negotiation efforts."
II. Applying the Fifth Amendment to Standoff Situations
The difficulty of applying traditional custodial interrogation analysis to
standoff cases, and the importance of non-constitutional policy considera-
tions in such cases prompt a close comparison between traditional Mi-
randa-type interrogation and the standoff setting. This examination
reveals that both settings in fact implicate Fifth Amendment rights.
A. Miranda and the Right Against Self-Incrimination
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination is fundamental to the criminal justice system."
It emphasized that the root of this right lies in a concern for the dignity of
the individual." Because the state must respect the individual, the Fifth
Amendment requires that the government rely on its own independent
efforts to invoke criminal sanctions against a citizen, rather than on a
confession extracted by compulsion," even if there is no reason to doubt
37. 638 F.2d at 591 (Adams, J., concurring) ("Once alerted to the possibility that the government
may abuse or breach its assurances of aid and friendship, suspects may be more reluctant to negotiate
with the police.")
38. Instead of resolving this dilemma through a judicially imposed device, Judge Adams concluded
that "[t]he final judgment . . . regarding the fairness or desirability of recording and introducing
statements obtained in situations such as the present one is . . . a policy decision for the executive
branch." Id. This Note reaches a different conclusion. For discussion of the competence of the courts
to make this decision, see pp. 358-60 infra.
39. 384 U.S. at 468. The literature generally refers to this provision of the Fifth Amendment as a
"privilege" rather than a "right." Even staunch supporters of the provision employ the less reverent
term. See, e.g., Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation?"
When Does it Matter? in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 139 (1980); Amsterdam, The
Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785 (1970). Indeed,
the Miranda Court itself called the right against self-incrimination a "privilege." See L. LEVY, supra
note 8, at viii.
40. 384 U.S. at 457, 460. The Miranda majority cited many other cases espousing this view of the
origins of the Fifth Amendment, including Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 414-15 n.12 (1966); Mur-
phy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55-57 n.5 (1964); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d
556, 579, 581-82 (Frank, J., dissenting), rev'd, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). See L. LEVY, supra note 8, at
330 (1968) (historical antecedents of Fifth Amendment reflect "natural repugnance to self-destruc-
tion"); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 n.174 (1978) (right against self-incrimination stems from respect that government
owes individual). But see Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional
Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 47 n.290 (1979) (contesting
position that government owes individual such respect).
41. 384 U.S. at 460 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235-38); see also 8 J. WIGMORE,
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the accuracy of that confession.42 Miranda warnings were designed to pro-
tect the right against self-incrimination by combatting the "inherently
compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation and permitting "a full op-
portunity to exercise the privilege. . . ."I' Reaching both involuntary and
voluntary confessions, 44 the Court attempted to ensure that each suspect
know at least of the existence of his rights before he confessed."
The Miranda Court was particularly concerned with interrogation
techniques that tend to discourage suspects from invoking their right
against self-incrimination. 46 For example, one of these techniques calls for
the interrogator to profess friendship for the suspect, whose best interests
the officer claims to serve.47 Although this tactic might extract a confession
that would be admissible under the traditional "voluntariness" test,4 the
supra note 2, § 2251, at 317 (government should "shoulder the entire load" necessary to convict
defendants).
42. 384 U.S. at 464 n.33. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (truth of defen-
dant's confession held irrelevant in determining voluntariness of confession under due process clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).
43. 384 U.S. at 467.
44. Id. at 457.
45. Thus, the Miranda Court was not concerned that some suspects might already be familiar
with their constitutional rights, independent of any warnings. Id. at 468.
46. Id. at 448-55. The Court emphasized that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented." Id. at 448. To illustrate the effects of such interroga-
tion, the Court quoted extensively from various police manuals describing interrogation procedures.
See note 9 supra.
47. 384 U.S. at 450-52. In this technique, the interrogator assumes an attitude of sympathy for
the suspect and interest in the latter's plight. C. O'HARA, supra note 9, at 110 ("The investigator is
not seeking to convict or punish. He is endeavoring to establish the facts of the case; . . . to help the
subject to straighten himself out .. "); R. ROYAL & S. SCHUTT, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEW-
ING AND INTERROGATION 61-62 (1976) (recommending that interrogator "establish a friendly and
trusting attitude on the part of the subject"). For discussions that are critical of this technique, see
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (disapproving confession given to police officer who ex-
ploited his childhood friendship with defendant); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (disapproving
confession given to psychiatrist posing as doctor intending to help defendant plagued by headaches);
White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 614-17 (1979) (discussing
"pretended friend" technique).
48. Before Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), which announced the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment to the states, the admissibility of confessions had been governed by the due process clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third
Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411, 420 (1954) (due process includes right to stand mute without being
subjected to pressures of serious human indignities). But see Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897) (federal case confession excluded under self-incrimination provision of Fifth Amendment).
Under the due process analysis, a voluntariness test was used to determine the admissibility of confes-
sions. The Supreme Court ultimately abandoned the voluntariness test in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), the precursor to Miranda. 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS
OF GUILT 122, 127 (1973). The voluntariness test examined whether, given the "totality of the rele-
vant circumstances of a particular situation," the confession was "the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice by its maker" or the product of an "overborne will." Culombe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 606 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Although the voluntariness test has been criticized for its amorphous nature, see Kamisar, What is
an "Involuntary' Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Con-
fessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 742 (1963), the test continues to have supporters. See, e.g., Grano,
supra note 26, at 944; Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99,
168 (Supreme Court has shown "apparent desire to return, ultimately, to the 'voluntariness' stan-
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use of such a psychological ploy to induce a suspect to relinquish his right
against self-incrimination offended the Miranda Court. The suspect
would in fact be deceived into incriminating himself; only too late would
he realize that his friendly interlocutor was actually an adversary.49
B. The Fifth Amendment Protects Standoff Suspects
The standoff situation involves a form of coercion similar to the psycho-
logical techniques that the Miranda Court perceived as threats to the sus-
pect's right to make an unconstrained and informed choice regarding self-
incrimination."0 In a standoff, the suspect is under pressure"' to talk to the
police, who represent his only link to the outside world and actively en-
courage him to unburden himself to them on any subject, including the
purported crime." Such efforts by police to cultivate feelings of friendship
and trust in the suspect increase the likelihood that he will speak openly
about his problems and, in doing so, incriminate himself.
In the conventional interrogation case, Miranda now requires that the
suspect receive warnings that preserve his opportunity to invoke the Fifth
Amendment."' For his statements to be admissible, the suspect must un-
derstand and waive his rights."4 The standoff suspect, by contrast, receives
no Miranda warnings and may experience a more intense compulsion to
speak than he would in a conventional setting. He is less likely to be
dard"). Cf United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 1980) (opinion of Seitz, C.J.) (state-
ments by armed and barricaded suspect must be voluntary to be admissible). Because Mesa did not
raise the voluntariness issue on appeal, however, Seitz did not reach this question.
49. Thus, the Court required the warning "that anything said can and will be used against the
individual in court . . . in order to make him aware not only of the privilege [against self-incrimina-
tion], but also of the consequences of forgoing it." 384 U.S. at 469.
50. Admittedly, the interrogator at the police station can direct the questioning more effectively
than the hostage negotiator can control the subject matter of the standoff conversation. This distinc-
tion, however, does not alter the fact that the standoff suspect has a right not to talk to the police at
all. Thus, because many suspects cannot appreciate the difference between incriminating and non-
incriminating statements, see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964) (suspect did not realize
that by accusing accomplice of pulling trigger, he was implicating himself in murder), the first Mi-
randa warning is expressed specifically in terms of a right to remain silent rather than one not to
incriminate oneself. See note 4 supra.
51. Indeed, the coercion experienced by an isolated individual completely surrounded by armed
police officers is arguably even greater than that inherent in conventional interrogation settings. See p.
353 infra. But see United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 588 (3d Cir. 1980) (opinion of Seitz, C.J.)
(standoff suspect's ability to move about motel room and not listen to officer's questions precludes
coercion).
52. See pp. 346-47 supra.
53. The Miranda Court was not content merely to ensure that the suspect be permitted to assert
his rights. Instead, the Court insisted that the police inform the suspect of the existence of those rights.
Only then could there be "any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise" of these
rights, 384 U.S. at 469, the prerequisite to ensuring that the suspect's statements would be "truly the
product of free choice." Id. at 457. See Schrock, Welsh, & Collins, supra note 40, at 41-42 (interpret-
ing Miranda as effort to preserve governmental respect for responsible choice by criminal suspects).
54. See 384 U.S. at 479 (after warnings, individual may knowingly and intelligently waive his
rights).
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aware of the investigatory nature of his conversation with the police."5
Moreover, the standoff suspect's understandable fear for his own life56
during the confrontation renders him all the more vulnerable to the
friendly overtures of a negotiator.5 7 Unless the conversation with the of-
ficer during the standoff is suppressed, the suspect will have unwittingly
forfeited his right to choose whether to incriminate himself. The apparent
friendliness of the police in the standoff situation need not involve con-
scious deception to implicate the Fifth Amendment interests, 8 since the
government's subsequent use of the conversation retroactively transforms
the officer from friend to adversary. 9
It should be emphasized, however, that recognition of Fifth Amendment
concerns in the standoff situation does not imply constitutional condemna-
tion of the police practice of negotiating surrenders. 0 Although the Mi-
randa Court held that confessions obtained without warnings could not be
used at trial, it did not explicitly outlaw any of the police interrogation
techniques that it considered responsible for generating an atmosphere of
compulsion at the stationhouse, nor did it chastise the police for unconsti-
55. Although the suspect undergoing conventional police interrogation is under pressure to speak
because of the immediate police presence in that setting that does not exist in the standoff situation,
the police purpose to gather evidence should be much more apparent to the conventional suspect than
to the standoff suspect. From the latter's viewpoint, the conversation with the police officer serves
primarily as an opportunity to relate his tale of woe to a sympathetic listener. See United States v.
Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 589-90 (3d Cir. 1980) (Adams, J., concurring).
56. Mesa expressed fear for his own safety several times during his conversation with Agent
Viater. See, e.g., Mesa transcript at 23, 38, 44, 45, 66. These fears certainly seem justified. As the
District Court remarked, "[tlhere were only three ways that Mr. Mesa could have left that motel
room: dead, injured and under arrest, or uninjured and under arrest." 487 F. Supp. at 566. See also
MAHER, supra note 35, at 25 (obvious police activity at standoff scene likely to disconcert emotionally
disturbed suspect).
57. A standoff suspect-such as Mesa-with severe emotional problems may be particularly eager
to bare his soul to a sympathetic listener. See MAHER, supra note 36, at 10, 13. Indeed, during his
conversation with Agent Viater, Mesa expressed interest in seeing a psychiatrist who would help him
talk about his troubles. Mesa transcript at 57-59.
58. The Miranda Court concentrated exclusively on the perspective of the suspect, not that of the
police. But see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71 (1980) (government violated defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel by intentionally creating situation in which defendant would be
"likely" to incriminate himself); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) ("interrogation"
defined as any words or actions "that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response").
59. Cf Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (officer appealed to suspect to reveal location of
victim's body in order to afford her "Christian burial"); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)
(suspect and police officer to whom he confessed had been boyhood friends); Kamisar, supra note 39,
at 169 (comparing Williams and Spano).
60. The reluctance of the Third Circuit to apply the Miranda case to the situation in Mesa may
stem from fear of appearing to condemn this practice. See 638 F.2d at 588 (opinion of Seitz, C.J.)
(unless warnings needed to protect standoff suspect's Fifth Amendment rights, court will not discour-
age practice of negotiating surrenders); id. at 597 (Weiner, J., dissenting) (entitlement to warnings
does not imply criticism of FBI procedures for standoff situations). See also id. at 598 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (suppression of conversation would not re-
quire agents to give warnings to standoff suspects).
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tutional conduct. 1 Similarly, the courts should be able simultaneously to
support police efforts to negotiate surrenders, and to preserve the rights of
standoff suspects.
III. Proposal: A Per Se Ban on Admissibility
Only a rule that bars outright the use of statements made by a suspect
during surrender negotiations in a standoff situation can accommodate the
pressing policy concerns inherent in this setting. Imposition of such a rule
would reflect the judicial responsibility of designing devices that effectively
protect constitutional rights.
A. Means Available to Protect the Rights of Standoff Suspects
Two different approaches could be employed to protect the Fifth
Amendment rights of criminal suspects: (1) administration of traditional
Miranda warnings, or (2) exclusion of the conversation without regard to
whether warnings are given. A comparison of the policy implications that
flow from these two approaches demonstrates the superiority of the per se
rule.
1. Administration of Warnings
The Supreme Court's response to the need for Fifth Amendment safe-
guards in police interrogation settings was to require the Miranda warn-
ings."2 The same requirement could be extended to standoff situations. In
evaluating such an approach, however, it is important to distinguish be-
tween the purpose the Miranda majority pursued and the particular pro-
cedures it mandated to fulfill that purpose. The Court ordered that the
police preface any interrogation with a series of warnings in order to en-
sure that criminal suspects would understand both the adversarial nature
of their situations 3 and their right not to speak to the police.6' The Court
anticipated that, having received this information, the suspect could make
an unconstrained and informed choice whether to respond to
interrogation. 5
In theory, one might allow the police to decide in each case whether to
administer warnings and risk unnecessary violence, or negotiate without
61. On the contrary, the Court expressed appreciation for the difficulties the police face in per-
forming criminal investigations, and denied that it intended to hamper that process in its efforts to
protect constitutional rights. 384 U.S. at 477, 481. See Sulger, The Role of the Police in Modern
Society, 3 POLICE L.Q., July, 1974, at 5-6 (denying that Miranda decision restrains police).
62. See note 4 supra.
63. 384 U.S. at 469. See p. 351 supra.
64. See note 4 supra.
65. See p. 352 supra.
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warnings and preclude the use at trial of any statements they obtain. 6
There are, however, compelling reasons not to adopt such an approach.
The volatility of a standoff situation should almost always make
peacekeeping concerns preeminent over less immediate investigatory goals
until the crisis has been resolved.67 A rule requiring the police to choose
between peacekeeping and crime investigation would needlessly expand
their discretion68 and might thus distract them from executing procedures
that would normally be employed to resolve such a crisis. 9 A heightened
risk to the safety of the suspect, the officers, any hostages, and the general
public would result.70 Furthermore, the great potential for second-guess-
ing police actions in such circumstances would frequently lead to public
criticism on either humanitarian or law enforcement grounds,7 depending
on the choice that was made. Thus, as a policy matter,72 Miranda warn-
ings do not constitute a satisfactory device to protect the rights of standoff
suspects.73
66. Judge Gibbons proposed this solution in his dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in
United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 598 (3d Cir. 1980).
67. See p. 349 supra.
68. Of course, the police do enjoy a wide range of discretion in order to cope with the myriad
vicissitudes that threaten the stability of society. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 171-75
(1967) (describing "adjudicative" choice of arresting officer whether criminal or civil commitment
proceedings should be instituted); H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 93, 94 (discussing various forms
of discretion); Saunders, supra note 10, at 82 ("[D]iscretion is the better part of peacekeeping.") Some
commentators have challenged the legitimacy of police discretion. See, e.g., Goldstein, Police Discre-
tion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low- Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69
YALE L.J. 543 (1960) (arguing against discretionary non-enforcement of criminal laws); Remington
& Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481 (same). Others
have recognized police discretion as inevitable, and have advocated increased rule making as a means
to giving the police greater guidance. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 10, at 116-33
(1973); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 80, 222 (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103-
04 (1967); LaFave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (pt. 2), 1962 WISC. L. REV. 179,
238-39.
69. Agent Viater indicated at the suppression hearing in Mesa that he had not considered the
possibility of a need for Miranda warnings before he talked to Mesa. Testimony of Theodore Viater,
reprinted in Appendix to Brief for Appellant 236, 238, United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir.
1980). An explicit ruling by a court that the police must decide whether to give warnings in order to
preserve any evidence obtained during standoff conversations would force future hostage negotiators to
consider that option. See p. 349 supra.
70. The objective of preventing harm to anyone in the area around a standoff led Chief Judge
Seitz in M'esa to reject a warnings rule. 638 F.2d at 588-89. Obviously, the suspect himself may be
harmed if the police use force; he may also attempt suicide. Indeed, Mesa contemplated the latter
action, Mesa transcript at 28, 34, 55, which he later said he would have taken, had he not talked to
Viater. 638 F.2d at 590 (Adams, J., concurring).
71. The prospect of criticism for choosing the wrong course of action might cause the police to
select still a third alternative: rather than risk criticism through negotiation (with or without warn-
ings), the police could choose to take the suspect by force immediately. Again, the peacekeeping func-
tion would be sacrificed, though not in favor of any investigatory purpose, since no additional evidence
would be revealed. See United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 597, 598 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J., dis-
senting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
72. See p. 349 supra.
73. Furthermore, Miranda warnings might not provide adequate protection for the constitutional
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2. Per Se Exclusion of Standoff Conversations
Instead of requiring that police give standoff suspects Miranda warn-
ings to preserve the admissibility of the conversation, courts could simply
hold these conversations inadmissible per se.74 Such a rule would be lim-
ited to situations where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect7
whom they have surrounded76 and with whom they converse in order to
facilitate his peaceful, formal arrest. Like the Miranda decision, the rule
would preserve the opportunity of the suspect to exercise his right against
self-incrimination.
rights of standoff suspects. The warnings-particularly the admonition that anything the suspect says
can and will be used against him-are intended to convey to the suspect the adversarial nature of his
conversation with the police, in order to protect his right against self-incrimination. See p. 352 supra.
In the standoff situation, the officer's appeals to trust and friendship would contradict, if not effec-
tively cancel, this warning. See p. 353 supra. Thus, it seems likely that the warnings would not
accomplish the function for which they were designed; the purpose of Miranda, to secure Fifth
Amendment rights, would accordingly go unfulfilled.
74. Presumably, such a rule would not affect the admissibility of standoff conversations for im-
peachment purposes. Cf Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (if trustworthy, statement ob-
tained without Miranda warnings is admissible to attack defendant's credibility as witness).
75. The Miranda Court clearly intended to exempt from its holding interviews where the police
lack probable cause to arrest the people they question. 384 U.S. at 477. ("General on-the-scene ques-
tioning . . . of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding .... ") Probable
cause thus becomes a necessary element of the per se rule proposed in this Note. This feature is in
accordance with current law. See, e.g., United States v. Welsh, 417 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1969) (admis-
sions by suspect before police obtained probable cause to arrest him held not subject to Miranda rule).
Compare State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 456 S.W.2d 840 (1970) (questioning suspect as to whether
he was driver of car involved in fatal accident held not subject to Miranda) with 39 TENN. L. REV.
178, 181 (1971) (criticizing Morris court for not finding probable cause, which would have rendered
case subject to Miranda requirements).
76. Although the rule proposed here does not require that the police be able to exercise complete
physical control over the suspect, its applicability does depend on the capacity of the police to prevent
the suspect from escaping. Without substantial limitation on his freedom, the suspect would not be
subjected to compulsion of constitutional proportions. See note 27 supra.
77. It is true, of course, that an opposite per se rule could also achieve the result of resolving the
police dilemma. Under such a rule, standoff conversations would always be admissible. The Califor-
nia courts have created an emergency exception doctrine that allows police who arrest a suspect to ask
the location of a known victim before administering Miranda warnings. Statements then made by the
suspect are admissible as evidence, as is the "fruit" of those statements. See People v. Riddle, 83 Cal.
App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937 (1979); People v. Dean, 39 Cal.
App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974); People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398
P.2d 753 (1965). The rationale of this doctrine lies in the preeminent purpose of rescuing the victim
of a crime from possible harm or death. It reflects the fear that, should the warned suspect invoke his
rights, the police might lose their only chance to rescue the victim.
The California emergency doctrine has received the approval of several commentators, especially
critics of the Miranda decision. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in BENCHMARKS
266, 277 (1967); Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial,
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 677-78 n.86 (1966). On the other hand, the doctrine has also been attacked
as a legal non sequitur, for the paramount need to save lives does not logically establish the admissi-
bility of statements obtained without Miranda warnings. Cf Graham, What is "Custodial Interroga-
tion? " California's Anticipatory Application of Miranda v. Arizona, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 59, 120
n.324 (1966) (comparing exclusion of unwarned statements obtained during emergencies to statutory
immunity); Comment, People v. Dean, Another Swipe at Miranda, 4 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 85, 96
(1975) (criticizing reasoning in Dean). The real dilemma posed by such an emergency case is not
between the victim's life and the defendant's constitutional rights, but rather between the latter's
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Nothing in the Miranda decision precludes a per se ban on the admissi-
bility of standoff negotiations.7" Fifth Amendment infringements do not
occur until the state attempts to use compelled confessions in criminal
cases." Accordingly, Miranda warnings possess no constitutional signifi-
cance independent of their purpose. A police officer's failure to administer
them does not in itself, therefore, violate the Constitution. The opposite
interpretation would require one to condemn as a Fifth Amendment viola-
tion the officer's decision to talk the standoff suspect into surrender."
Unlike the warnings alternative, the per se rule would eliminate any
incentive the police might have to curtail their peacekeeping function in
order to further their efforts to obtain evidence. 2 This rule would allow
the police to exercise the discretion necessary to resolve standoff situations
peacefully. 3 Yet the rule also recognizes that this discretion cannot dictate
the scope of constitutional rights.8 4 The rule would apply only to state-
rights and the state's interest in using his statements to convict him. See Graham, supra, at 120.
78. The availability of such an alternative may not be self-evident, because after fifteen years of
use, the A'firanda warnings have come to be viewed as virtually synonymous with Fifth Amendment
rights. See United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980) (not considering per se exclusionary
rule).
79. Only when a suspect's statements are used in court do they become legally "incriminating."
Thus, the doctrine of use immunity permits the government to compel a witness to testify in return for
a guarantee that none of the testimony will be used directly or indirectly in any subsequent prosecu-
tion of the witness. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (grant of immunity
coextensive with right against self-incrimination because immunity prohibits prosecutorial use of com-
pelled testimony). But see Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 799 (privilege against self-incrimination
"entirely insulates a suspect from being required to give incriminating responses; it does not merely
shield him from the incriminating use of those responses").
Professor Amsterdam fears that this interpretation of the scope of the Fifth Amendment will not
deter the police from engaging in "abusive conduct" toward arrested suspects. Id. at 804. But even if
the Fifth Amendment extends only to the use of incriminating statements, as argued here, the due
process clause continues to protect suspects from police abuse. See Paulsen, supra note 48, at 420;
Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN.
L. REV. 383, 393 (1977).
80. The second Miranda warning, which explains the consequences of forgoing the right to re-
main silent, simply informs the suspect that anything he says can and will be used against him in
court. 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966). This feature distinguishes the Fifth Amendment from the Fourth,
under which the actual police activity of conducting an unreasonable search and seizure represents the
locus of constitutional violation. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule aims at deterring illegal
police activity, see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), whereas the Fifth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule rises out of the constitutional prohibition of governmental use of compelled self-incrimi-
nating statements "against" a defendant; the Fourth Amendment can be furthered by an exclusionary
rule, while the Fifth Amendment is itself an exclusionary rule. Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New
York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
YALE L.J. 1198, 1214 (1971).
81. See p. 353 supra. Cf. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07 (1964) (continuing
undercover investigation was proper even though defendant's incriminating statements could not be
used against him without violating his right to counsel).
82. See p. 355 supra.
83. See note 68 supra (describing police discretion).
84. Cf State v. Sickels, 275 N.W.2d 809 (Minn. 1979) (police exercised proper discretion in
taking intoxicated and suicidal individual to detoxification center but should have administered Afli-
randa warnings before asking questions about unrelated crime in order to protect suspect's constitu-
tional rights).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 344, 1981
ments made before a formal arrest is consummated in a standoff situation.
Once the crisis has subsided and the standoff suspect is in the form of
custody that the Miranda Court envisioned, no countervailing policy goals
persist; the police can administer Miranda warnings safely and then pro-
ceed with a conventional interrogation."5
Opponents of the Miranda decision have often argued that the require-
ment of warnings creates an unacceptable barrier to the investigation of
crime. 6 The rule proposed here would doubtless elicit similar objections.8 7
But under this rule, standard interrogation procedures would remain
available to the police after the standoff suspect surrendered. There is no
reason to believe that the suspect who has confessed during a standoff is
any more likely to invoke his Miranda rights after surrender than the
suspect who undergoes a conventional arrest. Admittedly, information ob-
tained incident to the standoff negotiations may be lost under this rule.
But the need to resolve these crises peacefully outweighs the need to pro-
tect the admissibility of that evidence, which in most cases will not be
essential for conviction.8
B. Judicial Authority to Implement a Per Se Ban
Although policy considerations prompt the per se exclusionary rule that
this Note proposes, the authority of courts to impose it derives from their
power to establish rules that further the enforcement of constitutional
rights.8 9 Miranda warnings are only one method of protecting Fifth
85. In order to conform with the Miranda decision's requirement that the suspect understand the
nature of his constitutional rights, however, the police should be required to supplement the tradi-
tional warnings with an additional admonition that nothing the suspect has said during the surrender
negotiations may be used against him in court. Cf Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit,
and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 358 (person who voluntarily confesses
to robbery without knowing that this crime also involved a killing should be instructed of this fact,
warned in accordance with Miranda, and told that his initial statement cannot be used against him).
86. See Iiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 500 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part) (voicing fear that decision would weaken law enforcement efforts); id. at 517 (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (same); id. at 541 (White, J., dissenting) (same); H. FRIENDLY, supra note 77, at 275-
76; Inbau, Law Enforcement, the Courts, and Individual Liberties, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR
TIME 97, 108 (A. Howard ed. 1965) (requirement that suspect be advised of right to silence and right
to counsel will result in fewer convictions). Empirical studies of the impact of Miranda, however,
suggest that it has not interfered with criminal investigations. See, e.g., 0. STEPHENS, supra note 48,
at 168; Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1613
(1967).
87. Cf 26 VILL. L. REV. 682, 697 (1981) (Third Circuit decision in Mesa reflects desire to avoid
unnecessarily hampering police).
88. The fact that the police already have probable cause to make the arrest demonstrates the
ancillary nature of confessions in standoff situations. See p. 356 supra. In M'esa, for example, two
eyewitness victims had informed the FBI that the suspect had shot them. Furthermore, standoff situa-
tions that occur at the scene of a crime will frequently contain a great deal of physical evidence whose
admissibility the rule will not affect. The rule only reaches evidence that arises directly from the
surrender negotiations themselves.
89. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407
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Amendment rights. The judiciary may reject that method in favor of other
devices if its use would threaten independent policy concerns, and if the
alternatives are equally effective in furthering the constitutional values at
stake. The Court has implicitly acknowledged its power to weigh policy
considerations when designing remedies to vindicate constitutional provi-
sions" in such contexts as illegal searches by police,91 employment dis-
crimination on sexual grounds by members of Congress," failure of prison
officials to provide adequate medical attention for inmates, 93 and school
desegregation. 4 In standoff situations, this approach dictates the selection
of a pure exclusionary rule instead of a rule that would encourage the
police to abdicate essential peacekeeping functions.9
The Miranda Court recognized that a warnings procedure was not the
only possible solution to the Fifth Amendment problem of coerced confes-
sions. In fact, the Court indicated that it considered the warnings the min-
imum level of protection required to secure the right against self-incrimi-
nation. 6 Thus, the courts should be free to select any other protective
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (judiciary has particular responsibility to assure vindication of consti-
tutional rights).
90. See Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979) (to give meaning to
constitutional values, courts can design remedies similar in scope to policy measures prescribed by the
executive and legislative branches); Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1972) (judiciary should have prerogative to prescribe remedies that
fulfill constitutional norms).
91. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (deriving damages remedy from Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures).
92. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (deriving damages remedy from due process
clause of Fifth Amendment).
93. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (deriving damages remedy from Eighth Amend-
ment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment).
94. The weighing of policy choices in designing remedies under the Fourteenth Amendment is
especially apparent in school desegregation cases. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971), the Court recognized that busing of children to achieve school
desegregation might, under certain circumstances, pose a "risk [to] the health of the children or signif-
icantly impinge on the educational process." The Court went on to suggest that many factors and
competing values must be considered in determining the appropriateness of a particular busing plan,
and then proceeded to order such a plan.
95. The most troublesome case challenging the legitimacy of the per se rule proposed in this Note
would be one where the police administered Miranda warnings to a standoff suspect who subse-
quently waived his rights and made incriminating statements to the police before surrendering. Unless
the suspect could later successfully attack the validity of his waiver, see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (establishing that waiver of Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be "intelligent"); see
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (applying rigorous Zerbst standards to custodial
interrogation); note 73 supra (questioning constitutional efficacy of Miranda warnings in standoff
situations), the court would be in the position of barring a constitutionally valid confession on pure
policy grounds. Despite this anomaly, the important objective of lending guidance to the police for
future standoff situations militates in favor of upholding the per se rule.
96. 384 U.S. at 467 (any other custodial interrogation procedures must be "at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
it") (emphasis supplied). Cf. Dellinger, supra note 90, at 1560-61 (Congress may replace Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule with substantive remedy that would "provide comparable vindication of
the interests protected by the displaced remedy.")
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device that would preserve Fifth Amendment rights at least as well as do
the warnings. The per se exclusionary rule should be adopted because it
provides the greatest amount of protection possible.
IV. Related Settings
The concerns that make application of traditional analysis difficult in
the standoff situation may be present as well in a variety of other criminal
justice settings in which the verbal cooperation of the defendant is re-
quired. For example, it is sometimes necessary or desirable to obtain in-
formation from a defendant in order to determine custody status," evalu-
ate competency to stand trial,98 conduct plea bargaining,99 and impose
sentence."' 0 All of these processes involve the collection of data to deter-
mine the proper treatment for the defendant within the system. Just as
peaceful resolution of a standoff situation may require a "friendly" con-
versation," ' so efficient gathering of essential data may depend on a con-
97. See People v. Brown, 438 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (statement defendant made
during prearraignment interview used to determine eligibility for recognizance or bail release held
inadmissible in government's case-in-chief "as a matter of public policy and fundamental fairness");
see also Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (statements made during
interview of suspect by prison employee for purpose of determining proper custody classification held
inadmissible); Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (same).
98. See p. 361 infra.
99. Effective plea bargaining requires a candid exchange between prosecutor and defendant re-
garding the facts surrounding the crime charged. People v. Tanner, 45 Cal. App. 3d 345, 351, 119
Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1975) (letters from defendant to prosecutors during course of bona fide plea
negotiations held inadmissible). Discouraging such a candid exchange would frustrate the goal of
attaining settlements. Id. Cf. People v. Campbell, 66 Cal. App. 3d 806, 808, 136 Cal. Rptr. 149, 150
(1977) (admission of confession in transcript of Municipal Court arraignment proceeding held
grounds for reversal of conviction). But cf State v. Harris, 147 Conn. 589, 164 A.2d 399 (1960)
(statements made by defendant before institution of criminal proceedings during conferences defendant
instigated in order to persuade state's attorney not to prosecute held admissible).
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) authorizes the probation office to conduct a presentence investiga-
tion of a defendant's character and background in order to assist the court in pronouncing sentence.
The investigation consists in large part of an interview of the defendant by a probation officer. The
rule specifies that the report resulting from the presentence investigation "shall not be submitted to the
court or its contents disclosed to anyone unless the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or
has been found guilty." The rule thus guards against possible prejudice that would result from pre-
mature use of presentence investigation reports, see Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969);
United States v. Warren, No. 79-162 (D.C. Oct. 9, 1981), and encourages suspects to speak freely
during their interviews, cf People v. Hicks, 4 Cal. 3d 757, 763, 94 Cal. Rktr. 393, 396, 484 P.2d 65,
68 (1971) (if defendants knew that damaging admissions to probation officers could be used against
them in another trial, they would not talk freely and purpose of interview would be frustrated).
Compare People v. Garcia, 240 Cal. App. 2d 9, 13, 49 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (1966) (upholding admis-
sibility of voluntary statements made by defendant to probation officer before sentencing but criticizing
use of such statements on policy grounds) with People v. Quinn, 61 Cal. 2d 551, 554, 39 Cal. Rptr.
393, 395, 393 P.2d 705, 707 (1964) (statements by defendant to probation officer after guilty plea
held involuntary because they were extracted by threat not to recommend leniency).
101. Seep. 346 supra. A similar tension exists in conversations between parole officers and parol-
ees, see State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 583, 442 P.2d 11, 15 (1968) (parole officer must give warnings
in order to preserve admissibility of defendant's statements), and conversations between probation
officers and probationers, see State v. Johnson, 87 S.D. 43, 46, 202 N.W.2d 132, 134 (1972) (proba-
tioner's statements to probation officer admissible because requiring Miranda warnings would frus-
Standoff Situations
genial, non-antagonistic interaction between an official and a defendant.
The rule proposed here might, therefore, be extended to encompass these
settings. For example, the per se exclusionary rule might have been ap-
plied profitably in the recent case of Estelle v. Smith.' In that case, the
state employed a psychiatrist to determine the competency of a criminal
defendant to stand trial and attempted to use the defendant's statements to
the psychiatrist at the sentencing phase of the trial as evidence that the
defendant would pose a future threat to society.' °3 The Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment precluded such use of the statements."0 4 At
the same time, however, the Court held that the state may use the same
answers for competency determination purposes without constitutional vi-
olation."0 5 As a result, the legitimate policy goal of evaluating competency
is furthered without any compromise of the right against self-incrimina-
tion. On the other hand, the Smith decision seems to create a variation of
the standoff dilemma'06 for the psychiatrist conducting the competency ex-
amination. Under Smith, the psychiatrist can preserve the admissibility of
the defendant's statements by administering Miranda warnings and pro-
curing a waiver from the defendant." 7 Giving the warnings, however, may
lead the defendant to become uncooperative and thus frustrate the govern-
ment's purpose in conducting the examination. Extension of the per se
exclusionary rule to this setting would, as in the standoff case, extinguish
the dilemma by recognizing the inappropriateness of warnings. Were the
government not permitted to retain an interest in using the interview for
incriminatory purposes, the competency examination could proceed with-
out difficulty.
Conclusion
In Miranda, the Supreme Court acknowledged that criminal suspects
are subject to coercion during custodial police interrogation. In order to
protect the suspect's opportunity to assert his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, it held that the police must inform the suspect
trate rehabilitative purpose of probation).
102. 101 S. Ct. 1866 (1981).
103. For capital cases, Texas law requires that the jury decide the issues of guilt and penalty in
separate proceedings. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury considers three questions, which, if
answered affirmatively, result in mandatory imposition of the death penalty. TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981). One of these questions is "whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society."
Id. art. 37.071(b)(2).
104. Id. at 1872-73.
105. Id. at 1876. Contra, Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government
Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARV. L. REV.
648 (1970).
106. See p. 349 supra.
107. 101 S. Ct. at 1876.
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of his rights and warn him of the consequences of waiving them. The
Court did not, however, declare unconstitutional any particular interroga-
tion techniques.
The standoff situation presents the same danger of coercion that existed
in the custodial interrogation setting in Miranda. Yet, in the standoff situ-
ation, Miranda warnings prove an ill-advised and perhaps ineffective so-
lution to the problem." 8 A per se rule against the admissibility of a
standoff suspect's pre-arrest statements would simultaneously protect his
opportunity to invoke his rights, and encourage the police to pursue the
desirable policy of peaceful crisis resolution.
108. See note 73 supra.
